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The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law
James Thuo Gathii ∗
Introduction
My paper will focus on the lawmaking power of the Financial Accounting Task Force, (“FATF”)
as an international organization and how its work is now being consolidated by being
incorporated within the G20's framework for global financial reform. FATF reform therefore
constitutes an end run around governments and professional societies. Such an end runs around
States to implement legal reforms to combat money laundering and terrorism raises several
issues that are addressed in this paper.

FATF reforms to combat money laundering and terrorism have raised high level discussions
within leading law societies, like the American Bar Association in the U.S. that is providing a
push back to the FATF 40+9, as well as the October 2008 Lawyer Guidance. By contrast, such
discussions around FATF money laundering and terrorism financing laws are conspicuously
absent in developing countries, where FATF reforms are being promoted through well-funded
aid programs and training of government officials, almost to the total exclusion of those to whom
it applies in the private sector, including those in the real estate industry, the legal profession and
accountants. This paper will contrast recent legislation in Kenya implementing the FATF’s antimoney laundering standards with the continuing discussion within the American Bar Association
and the fact that no State in the European Union has yet commenced even considering similar
obligations on lawyers, the real estate industry or other gatekeepers subject to the FATF’s antimoney laundering and anti-terrorism financing standards.

∗
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FATF Background
The FATF is a 35-member organization established by the G7 in 1989 with a view to better
addressing anti-money laundering initiatives worldwide. Its mandate was broadened in October
2001 to include “the fight against terrorist financing.” 2 In October 2008, the FATF’s mandate
was widened again to include responses to “proliferation financing and vulnerabilities in new
technologies which could destabilize the international financial system.” 3 The FATF has issued
40+9 recommendations, 40 with regard to money laundering and 9 with regard to terrorist
financing. The FATF has become the leading international standard setter on money laundering
and anti-terrorist financing. 4
The FATF has 33 member States, which set out its mandate, 5 and it is housed within the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It is not a permanent international
institution since its current mandate is due to expire at the end of 2012. It is unlike typical
international organizations that have a constituent charter. While it cannot therefore issue legally
binding rules, its mandate to combat money laundering is tied to several very powerful
international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the UN
Security Council, and it has the backing of powerful governments like the United States, and

2

See FATF/GAFI, About the FATF, available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
3
FATF, Revised Mandate 2008-2012 (Apr. 12, 2008) available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/3/32/40433653.pdf.
4
According to the FATF, the FATF “is recognised as the global standard setter on anti-money laundering and
counter terrorist financing issues by the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. For
example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1617 urged the international community to implement the
FATF Standards. The endorsement of the FATF Standards by the Security Council is a very helpful factor in getting
jurisdictions to effectively implement the Standards, especially for those few United Nations members that are not
yet a member of the FATF or an FSRB,” President of FATF, Briefing to the United Nations Security Council
Committee (New York, Oct. 26, 2009), at http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/49/0,3343,en_32250379_32236879_43948849_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter “Briefing to UN
Sec. Council”].
5
The FATF is a Ministerial Level Committee.
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international organizations like the European Union. As such, what we may call the soft law of
the FATF is hardened by its direct incorporation in UN Security Council Resolutions or IMF
conditionality. 6 The links between the FATF and the Security Council are not surprising given
that a major role of the FATF is the identification of money laundering and terrorist financing
threats. 7

The FATF therefore works closely with the Counter-Terrorism Committee as well as the 1267
Sanctions Committee of the Security Council, both of which have sweeping authority on
counter-terrorism measures in the world today. 8 To that end, the FATF has issued the IX Special
Recommendations on Implementation of UN Resolutions against terrorist financing, which
require jurisdictions to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Implement the United Nations Terrorist Financing Convention and United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373;
Criminalize terrorist financing;
Have systems in place for the freezing and confiscation of terrorist assets;
Introduce reporting of terrorist financing related transaction;
Have systems in place for extradition and mutual legal assistance in terrorist financing cases;
Take measures to prevent the misuse of alternative remittance systems;
Require banks to send information on the payee with each transfer;
Ensure that non-profit organizations are not misused; and

6

See supra note 3 (showing the FATF is conscious of that the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council make
the enforcement of its standards more likely than not). See also MARK POLLACK & GREGORY SHAFFER, WHEN
COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009)
(discussing how soft law norms may become hardened by adoption by international organizations with the ability to
enforce them such as the adoption of soft law norms of Codex Alimentarius into the hard law framework of WTO).
7
Revised Mandate 2008-2012, supra note 2, at 2.
8
According to the FATF, “[w]e place great importance on the relationship with the United Nations, in particular
with your Committee (“CTC”) and its Executive Directorate (“CTED”), as well as with the 1267 Committee, the
1540 Committee and the Vienna based UNODC,” Briefing to UN Sec. Council, supra note 3. The 1267 Sanctions
committee was established in 1999 to monitor compliance with sanctions imposed on the then Taliban controlled
Afghanistan under Security Council Resolution 1267of October, 1999. However, the initial flight bans and asset
freezes imposed by that resolution to be monitored by the 1267 Sanctions Committee were expanded to include
monitoring an arms embargo and asset freezes through Resolution 1333of 2000. “In January 2002 the Council
expanded the Committee’s domain further to permit it to examine states’ compliance with measures targeting the
Taliban, Al Qaeda, or their supporters anywhere in the world (Resolution 1455),” Jose E. Alvarez, International
Organizations as Law-Makers, 174-175 (2005)

3

•

Have measures in place to detect cross border smuggling of cash. 9

There is also UN Security Council Resolution 1617, which endorses the FATF’s 40+9
Recommendations. 10 In addition, a former President of the FATF opined that the FATF was
“especially pleased with the United Security Resolution 1617 (2005)…[and that this resolution
was] a major step toward effective global implementation of the [FATF’s] Recommendations. 11

As noted above, the original reason for the establishment of the FATF was the formulation of
legal, financial and law enforcement polices to combat money laundering. This standard-setting
role is ongoing as the FATF revises and clarifies these standards to allow for “the right balance
between giving the required stability to the FATF standards, whilst allowing for the necessary
flexibility to respond to the changing nature of the threats faced.” 12 This ongoing legislative
process happens through the FATF interpretive and guidance notes to its 40+9
recommendations. 13

To complement this standard-setting role, the FATF seeks to ensure effective compliance of its
standards. It does so by recommending its anti-money laundering policies and laws to its
members and non-members and by generating the “political will to bring about national
legislative and regulatory reforms.” 14 In this sense, the FATF sees itself as a policy-making

9

Id .
Resolution 1617 ( S/RES/1617(2005) (29th July 2005) at para. 7 “strongly urges all Member States to implement
the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) Forty
Recommendations on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing,” id.
Some commentators have argued that such endorsement is tantamount to making the standards international law
Such a view is mistaken. See Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF And Its Institutional Partners: Improving the
Effectiveness And Accountability of TransGovernmental Networks, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 59 (2008).
11
Kader Asmal, Foreword, FATF Annual Report 2005-2006.
12
Revised Mandate 2008-2012, supra note 2, at 2.
13
See FATF, The Interpretive Notes to the Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/53/0,3343,en_32250379_32236947_34261877_1_1_1_1,00.html
14
See About the FATF, supra note 1.
10
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body, which closely monitors the adoption of its standards and assists countries in implementing
them. It also conducts reviews through what it calls a mutual evaluation process among its 35
members. 15 For its associate members, which are primarily non-European Third World countries,
the FATF has established FATF-Style Regional networks, which serve as platforms for a peer
review process. 16 Countries that do not meet FATF standards are designated as non-cooperative
countries or territories for failure to adopt anti-money laundering laws or anti-terrorist financing
laws or regulations consistent with its recommendations and policies. For example, in 2000, five
Caribbean countries were blacklisted as non-cooperative countries. 17

The FATF has established a new review mechanism, dubbed the International Co-operation
Review Group (“ICRG”), based on the premise that a global commons approach to
implementation of its standards is the more preferable method of seeking individual country
compliance. According to the FATF, a global commons approach would ensure that compliance
in one country is not undermined by non-compliance in another country. 18 The success rate of
adoption of FATF standards stands at only 25% as of its last review in September 2009. 19

FATF Reforms as Global Administrative Law
15

India is said to be on the cusp of joining the FATF as a member, which would make it the 36th member.
These are the Asia Pacific group on Money Laundering; the Caribbean Financial Task Force; the Council of
Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of
Terrorism; the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America and the Middle East and North
Africa Financial Action Task Force. The FATF also has observer bodies and organizations such as the regional
development banks. For more on this, see FATF, Members and Observers, available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236869_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
17
See Jason Ennis, Cleaning Up the Beaches: The Caribbean Response to the FATF’s Review to Identify NonCooperative Countries or Territories, 8 L. & BUS. REV. OF THE AM. 637 (2002).
18
Briefing to UN Sec. Council, supra note 3
16

19

According to the FATF “[a]s of early September 2009, 129 jurisdictions have been assessed by the FATF, by an
FSRB, by the IMF or by the World Bank. Of these jurisdictions, 30 have sufficiently implemented the United
Nations Terrorist Financing Convention and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1237 and 1373. 99
jurisdictions have not. Similarly, of the 129 jurisdictions assessed, only 21 had effective systems in place to freeze
terrorist assets, 108 jurisdictions had not. The average compliance ratio for all IX Special Recommendations stands
at 25%, which is slightly higher than the compliance with the two recommendations I just mentioned that are based
on United Nations instruments,” Briefing to the UN Sec. Council, supra note 3.

5

A lot of the work of international organizations, (“IOs”), like the FATF, is very analogous to the
work conducted by domestic administrative agencies. Thought of as administrative agencies, IOs
affect not only States, but also non-State actors, including individuals and businesses. In fact, in
the recent past, the study of international organizations has turned to the study of them as
lawmakers. 20

Here are some ways in which IOs engage in standard-setting that amounts to Global
Administrative Law. IOs like the FATF have changed the process by which international law is
made – no longer is international law only made through diplomats representing States: now it is
made by international civil servants working with relevant domestic agencies. Second, the
content of international law has been changed by IOs since law-making now only partly involves
tit-for-tat reciprocal concessions–now it also involves the development of standards, often nonbinding, but with potential to harden into binding norms. IOs are therefore now making rules of
international and domestic law–no longer are States the sole makers of rules of international law
as international law has until recently been understood.

The FATF’s recommendations and lawyer guidance are forms of global administrative law. This
is because the FATF acts as a domestic standard-setting or administrative agency in a variety of
ways. First, it is staffed by groups of experts working with international civil servants and
governmental representatives. Second, the standards formulated by IOs do not require domestic
implementing legislation as is required for treaties as is for example required under Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, even though the output of these International
Organizations affects individuals and businesses. As such, IOs have the ability to formulate
20

See, e.g., JOSE ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS (2005).

6

standards that may eventually become legally binding without requiring domestic incorporation
through the procedures used to ratify treaties. This is because experts, rather than diplomats,
formulate these standards. While expert driven decision-making does not necessarily imply
domestic ratification procedures should be short-circuited, it is now the practice that IO-set
standards are not subject to the typical domestic ratification processes to which treaties are
subject.

This kind of law-making by IOs like the FATF raises the specter of “agency capture” by special
interest groups or particular governments. In the case of the FATF, the overwhelming presence
of Western market oriented economies among its 35 members, as well as the exclusion of all but
one African country among this core membership, means that the promulgation of the FATF’s
agenda primarily, if not exclusively, reflects the priorities and interests of these countries. In
essence, the FATF makes rules in an unrepresentative manner to the extent to which those
integrally involved in designing the standards are its core 35 members, yet the IMF promotes the
standards as universally applicable–to all countries whether they are members or not. 21 Countries
who are associate members of the FATF’s regional networks as well as those that have observer
status within the FATF do not have the power to participate in formulating FATF
recommendations or standards. Instead, these are handed down to them for their implementation.
As such, they have to implement recommendations they had no role in formulating, or no notice
of or opportunity to comment on as in modern administrative standard-setting agencies. 22 This
point is further fortified by virtue of the fact that the experts who participate in formulation of
21

IMF, A FACTSHEET: THE IMF AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
(2007).
22
An excellent overview of the meetings of the FATF and the attendees primarily from European and American law
societies primarily in European cities is, Kevin L. Shepherd, “Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative and
the Risk-Based Approach for Transactional Lawyers,” 43 Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal, 607 (2009)
(Of the many FATF meetings at which its recommendations were being discussed, only a 2007 meeting in Berne,
had representatives from a sub-Saharan African Country, see id. at note 135)
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FATF standards are appointed and paid by these western countries. 23 In addition, these experts
are accountable to institutions like the Security Council and the International Monetary Fund,
which are dominated by these powerful western States.

The illegitimacy of international institutions like FATF, however, goes well beyond the
democratic deficit and the opaque manner in which they operate. The authority of international
institutions, and in particular international economic institutions like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), raises fundamental questions, not simply from the point of
view of the participation of non-western countries in standard formulation, but of the unequal
and imbalanced power exercised by the wealthy countries that control the agenda of these
institutions. For example, it is arguable that the FATF, like the World Bank and IMF, has
become an instrument of Western States to manage and control a vast array of economic and
social realities in the overwhelming majority of developing countries, 24 which exercise little or
no power over the agenda of these institutions.

Notably, while the participation of non-member states would give voice to constituencies that are
not currently represented in the decision-making of international institutions, it is also crucial to
promote additional mechanisms that would give such poor states control over decisions and
policies of international institutions that affect them – such as those of the FATF. It is only by
rejecting the inevitability of FATF-type driven law-making that there can be redefinition of the
choices made in centers of power that are insensitive to the concerns of those without a voice
within them. As FATF recommendations stand now, they are resulting in unequal consequences
23

See IMF, Technical Assistance on AML/CTF, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml3.htm#capabilities (noting the IMF’s legal department provides
technical assistance for compliance with FATF recommendations )
24
Rajagopal Balakishnan, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements and the Expansion of
International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 541 (2000).
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for populations in the west and those outside the west. Those outside the west are being
pressured to adopt binding legal rules embedding the FATF’s recommendations, while for the
most part their western counterparts are getting away with a risk- or standards-based approach to
implementing FATF recommendations which come without the possibility of criminal or other
penalties. As such, the differential impact of FATF recommendations on the basis of national and
other differences must be explored. 25 Ultimately, procedural solutions to the problem of
international institutional illegitimacy seldom address the formal inequality embedded in the
system of weighted voting particularly in international financial institutions that is in turn a
crucial linchpin in the crafting of projects of neo-liberal economic reformism.

It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the U.S. and the OECD countries often shift
standard-setting from institutions like the WTO to forums where they can impose their
preferences in a top-down fashion without giving less powerful countries the opportunity to
participate in the formulation of such preferences. For example, the U.S. has recently shifted
more towards bilateral and regional trade agreements as these give it more leverage, unlike at the
WTO where developing countries have earnestly begun acting in concert against the policies of
the most powerful countries. Another example is the shift of the Clinton Administration and
OCED Countries away from the IMF and the WTO to an umbrella organization of the U.S. and
the OCED, known as the Financial Stability Forum, to address what they referred to as predatory

25

Para 108 of the lawyer guidance for examples singles out countries subject to sanctions and embargoes, those
lacking in appropriate laws or identified by credible sources as being locations from which funds to support terrorist
organizations or that have significant levels of corruption as representing a higher risk to AML/TF, see FATF, RBA
Guidance for Legal Professionals at 5 (Oct. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=2&ved=0CBcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fatfgafi.org%2Fdataoecd%2F5%2F58%2F41584211.pdf&ei=VFbjS4aSLYWclgfct_3DAg&usg=AFQjCNERaKEAjvI_
NA77MOYjo52h2UUq7A&sig2=XMTLG6RtDbX_1-qhdBl7fA Based on this, K Kevin L. Shepherd, “Guardians at
the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach for Transactional Lawyers,” 43 Real Property,
Trust and Estate Law Journal, 607, 652 (2009) concludes that an acquisition transaction with a business located in
Zimbabwe would pose a “higher risk based on the geographical location of the business being acquired,” id.
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tax competition from tax havens created by small island states. Such alternative forums were
consciously selected because they removed policy-making from the political process of global
negotiations. 26 The FATF is unsurprisingly housed within the OECD. Without the kind of
scrutiny that accompanies WTO initiatives, it then becomes possible to shield global lawmaking
from the kind of accountability mechanisms that the global administrative law project proposes.
Unsurprisingly, some developing countries have sought to move the monitoring of FATF
recommendations from the FATF to the IMF. After all, these countries have a voice, albeit an
extremely limited one, at the IMF as opposed to the FATF, where they have none. This is a little
surprising because developing countries have been critical of the neo-liberal economic reforms
of the IMF. In essence, by seeking to have reviews conducted through the IMF rather than
through the much less transparent FATF process, developing countries were ineluctably helping
to consolidate the very economic reform programs that they have consistently found
objectionable. For these countries, the threat of being declared non-compliant by the FATF was
enough to persuade them to prefer an IMF review. 27

In effect, AML and CFT as a priority agenda of the G20 may very well be a reflection of what
Jose Alvarez has referred to hegemonic international law 28 – a set of rules that reflects the

26

Dr. Jason Sharman, Small States and Weapons of the Weak in the Global Governance of Tax and Financial
Services, Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Tasmania, Hobart (2003), available
at http://www.utas.edu.au/government/APSA/JSharmanfinal.pdf.
27

See Statement of Pedro Malan, Minister of Finance of Brazil to the Third Meeting of the International Monetary
and Finance Committee (April, 29, 2001) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2002/imfc/stm/eng/bra.htm (arguing that Brazil “will continue to give strong
support to the IMF's involvement in the fight against money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, in a manner
that is consistent with the Fund's mandate and expertise and that respects the cooperative nature of our institution.
We are pleased with the progress achieved so far in developing a methodology for assessing countries' efforts in
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and hope that it will lead to the approval of a ROSC in
this area that is applied in a uniform, voluntary and cooperative way,” id).
28
Jose Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, (2003). See also JAMES GATHII,
WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2010.
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interests of the predominant players in the international financial system. In fact, AML and CFT
have already been incorporated into the reform agenda of the international financial system as
evidenced by the endorsement of the work of the FATF by the G20 at its September 2009
Pittsburgh meeting. 29

The attention given to the ongoing work of the FATF, as well as calls for the tightening of AML
and CFT by the G20 in Pittsburgh does not fit well with the goal of alleviating poverty in poor
countries, which was a primary purpose of the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh. 30
Arguably, the focus on measures such as AML and CFT takes away from addressing
fundamental changes being proposed to regulate the international financial system and other
ancillary reforms to address some of the root causes of the crisis, such as having taxes on crossborder financial flows to control speculative capital flows or financial reforms aimed at
addressing the plight of poor economies that are bearing heavy costs of the financial crisis
around issues of basic needs such as food. 31

The Impact of FATF Recommendations on Financial Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa
Financial markets are perhaps the most open in terms of flow across national boundaries. Unlike
trade in goods and services, for example, cross-border financial transactions have not typically
been subject to national controls at the border. In fact, huge cross-border transactions happen

29

See Progress Report of the Actions to Promote Financial Regulatory Reform Issued by the U.S. Chair of the
Pittsburgh G-20 Summit- 25th September, 2010.(Particularly Item No. 40) available at
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/documents/organization/129866.pdf
30
On this see, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on
Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System (21 September 2009) available at
http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/FinalReport_CoE.pdf
31
Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 435,
439 (1997) (arguing that expert driven law making has a “narrow . . . vision of the role of the international
community . . . the plight of a billion people or so living in poverty seems to become a domestic problem, or at least
to have disappeared from the international agenda.” ).
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every day without any tax being levied on them. FATF recommendations are changing this
norm of regulatory freedom for flow of international finance. Although the FATF has argued it
does not intend to interfere with the flow of finance across national boundaries, the kind of laws
being currently adopted in developing countries, particularly in Africa suggest otherwise.

The work of the FATF is changing the landscape in a variety of ways and Kenya’s new law, The
Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2009, 32 which came into force on 1st of
January, 2010 exemplifies this.

This new law
introduces a powerful new domestic agency, the Financial Reporting Center, whose primary
obligation is assisting in the “identification of the proceeds of crime and the combating of money
laundering.” 33 As a result of public and parliamentary opposition, the new law excluded
references to terrorism financing. 34

It also introduces financial surveillance and reporting 35 obligations for attorneys, accountants,
real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, and casinos. 36 The new law provides that all cash
transactions over US $10,000 have to be reported to the Financial Reporting Center, 37 with no
obligation to tip-off the client about the report. The new law defines the surveillance and

32

No. 9 (2009), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 87, available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php.
33
§ 24(1).
34
Initial drafts of the new law were argued to have reintroduced an anti-terrorism bill that Parliament had previously
rejected since they were perceived as introducing an anti-terrorism legislation that parliament had previously
rejected.
35
§ 45(2) makes it an offence to fail to report suspicious transactions. Reports are to be filed with the Financial
Reporting Center, a new institution created under the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2009.
36
See § 2 (defining the designated non-financial business or professionals).
37
Art. 45(3).
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reporting obligations as follows: “[a] reporting institution shall monitor on an ongoing basis all
complex, unusual, suspicious, large or other transaction as may be specified in the regulations,
whether completed or not, and shall pay attention to all unusual patterns of transactions, to
insignificant but periodic patterns of transactions that have no apparent economic or lawful
purpose.” 38 So, in Kenya, like we are increasingly seeing in developing countries,
implementation of the FATF’s AML & CFT recommendations is taking a rules-based approach
since violations come with severe penalties. 39 By contrast, in jurisdictions like the United States,
the lawyer guidance is taking a risk-based approach with no potential legal penalties for
violation. This differs substantially from the approach of the Eastern and Southern African AntiMoney Laundering Group, which in August 2009 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
that adopted lock, stock and barrel all FATF recommendations. This MOU could be construed as
a treaty commitment to which of course these countries would be bound.

Kenya’s new law also potentially violates human rights – for example, the offence for possessing
proceeds of a crime is made retroactive. 40 In addition, its extensive forfeiture or confiscation
provisions are arguably in tension with the right to private property. Furthermore, the risk-based
approach places importance on certain places in the world where transactions originate or are
destined to. This raises the specter of profiling people based on geographical location or
nationality.

38

Art. 45(1).
See FATF, RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals at 5 (Oct. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=2&ved=0CBcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fatfgafi.org%2Fdataoecd%2F5%2F58%2F41584211.pdf&ei=VFbjS4aSLYWclgfct_3DAg&usg=AFQjCNERaKEAjvI_
NA77MOYjo52h2UUq7A&sig2=XMTLG6RtDbX_1-qhdBl7fA. (at para 7noting that “For some countries,
applying a rules-based system might be more appropriate,” id)
40
See § 2 (defining “proceeds of crime”).
39
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The new law also potentially violates attorney-client privilege. Section 18 provides that the
provisions of the new law “override any obligation as to secrecy or other restriction on disclosure
of information imposed by any other law or otherwise.” 41 While the new law seeks to preserve
attorney-client privilege in Section 19(1), it nevertheless authorizes warrantless inspections on
the premises of reporting institutions, such as law firms, of their documents as may be ordered by
the Director of the Financial Reporting Centre. 42 In addition, the new law obliges lawyers and
other professionals who have reporting obligations to give “all reasonable assistance” in
connection with an inspection ordered by the Financial Reporting Centre; 43 comply with
warrantless requests to appear before a Centre inspector 44 as well as to produce books or
documents. 45 Failure to assist with inspections is an offence that is punishable by imprisonment
for up to three years or fines of up to US $15,000 or both. 46 The new law also eviscerates bank
secrecy laws in Kenya since the warrantless inspections the Centre is empowered to undertake
are not required to be narrowly tailored.

In addition, the scope of who is required to report is especially broad–it may, for example, catch
an airline that sold a ticket to a passenger with links to groups designated or suspected to have
links to suspects in criminal networks that airlines may have no way of knowing in advance. To
further illustrate, section 46(1) requires reporting institutions to take reasonable measures to
satisfy themselves:

41

§ 18(1).
Art. 25(C). Such inspections are only required to be in writing. During an inspection, the inspectors are
empowered to “ask any questions relating to such documents and take copies of the whole or any part of such
documents.”
43
Art. 36(1).
44
Art. 36(1)(ii). Article 38((1) empowers the Financial Reporting Centre with power to seek a warrant to “enter any
premises belonging to or in the possession or control of a reporting institution or any officer or employee therefore,
and to search the premises and remove any document, material or other thing therein for the purposes of the Centre.”
45
Art. 36(1)(iii).
46
Art. 36(3)(a). Organizations such as law firms can be fined up to five times as much, see Art. 36(3)(a).
42

14

as to the true identity of any applicant seeking to enter a business
relationship with it or to carry out a transaction or a series of transactions
with it, by requiring the applicant to produce an official record reasonably
capable of establishing the true identity of the applicant such as (a) in the
case of an individual (i) a birth certificate; (ii) a national identity card; (iii)
a driver’s license; (iv) a passport; (v) any other official means of
identification as may be prescribed. 47
In short, the new law introduces the following rules for Financial Institutions and Designated
Non-Financial Business and Professions as well as Traders of all sorts to adopt customer
identification programs, conduct customer due diligence, increase the scope of and quality of
record keeping, and file suspicious activity reports or suspicious transaction reports. Notably,
these requirements are already required under Section 352 of the United States Patriot Act,
which goes further to require those subject to it to help in the fight against terrorism by adopting:
(i) internal policies, procedures, and controls (ii) designation of AML compliance officers; (iii)
ongoing employee training; (iv) independent audit functions to test AML program. 48 This is
bound to be very expensive for the kind of enterprises found in countries like Kenya.

These kind of obligations: client due diligence; record keeping and the establishment of
beneficial ownership are going to increase the cost of doing business and have been of concern to
the American Bar Association given the costs they would impose on attorneys. 49

47
Further, section 47 requires reporting institutions to establish and maintain not only records of all their
transactions Section 47(a); but also the “”name, physical and postal address and occupation (or where appropriate
business or principal activity) of each person – (i) conducting the transaction section 47(3)(i); or (ii) on whose behalf
the transaction is being conducted,” § 47(3)(a)(ii).
48
See Section 352(a) of the USA Patriot Act, Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56) amending Section 5318(h) of the
Bank Secrecy Act to require every financial institution to establish anti-money laundering programs.
49
See ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulations and the Legal Profession: Comments on Gatekeeper Provisions
of FATF Consultation Paper, April 3, 2003(arguing that these due diligence requirements ‘appear extremely broad’
and their effect would be to “prevent the ability of much of the public to consult lawyers on financial transactions,
including AML, because both clients and lawyers will fear potential adverse consequences for seeking or receiving
advice on the surrounding financial transactions, including AML requirements. The combination of terms such as
‘suspicious,’ ‘reasonable grounds’, and ‘attempted’ create an unworkable degree of uncertainty for the legal
profession and clients, particularly in light of criminal sanctions for, infractions and thereby will have an
unacceptable ‘chilling effect’ on the attorney-client relationship,” id. at pp. 5-6 (available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/taskforce/actions/gatekeeper.pdf) Note also, ABA, Task Force on Gatekeeper
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These developments are likely to be reproduced in many countries since they reflect the
standard-setting goals of the FATF. The FATF has been very effective in developing countries
like Kenya because its programs are tied to bilateral assistance programs of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). Many developing countries welcome the kind
of technical and capacity-building assistance that is promoted by bilateral aid agencies like
USAID. Often the assistance comes through the designation or appointment of experts paid for
on a temporary or permanent basis in target countries who work with designated staff from the
government in drafting and pushing through legislative and policy changes. Governments
without the capacity to engage in the merits and demerits of a broad array of such programs are
only too happy to play to the tune of donors. Government officers who work on such programs
have vested interests to support these programs since they come with perks, such as conference
and travel per diems, which departmental budgets allocated by the government do not have.

As a political matter, the capacity-building and technical assistance programs do not raise the
impression of imposition, as do programs sponsored by international financial institutions like
the IMF and World Bank.

Conclusions

Regulation and the Profession: Report to the House of Delegates, (Recommendation), Approved by the ABA House
of Delegates in Deb. 2003 at Resolution 1 stating that the ABA “opposes any law or regulation that, while taking
action to combat money laundering or terrorist financing, would compel lawyers to disclose confidential information
to government officials or otherwise compromise the lawyer-client relationship or the independence of the bar,” id.
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/taskforce/actions.html
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The FATF is gaining visibility as a standard-setting international organization. Its mandate is
now formally incorporated in the agenda of the G20 as well as in the work of the IMF and the
Security Council.
In the meantime, AML and CFT, particularly in poor countries, will be implemented in an ad hoc
and lackluster manner given that poor countries like Kenya have themselves not been at the
forefront of crafting the FATF’s recommendations. The implementation of Kenya’s new AntiMoney Laundering Law will depend on how much pressure the FATF and the countries and
organizations that back it–like the IMF and the Security Council–are willing to put brakes on
carrots Kenya receives from them or how ready they are to wield the stick over Kenya.

There will continue to be challenges to the FATF’s expert-driven standard-setting where the
standards are in tension with human rights standards for example. We have already seen such
challenges to FATF-type standards in the British Court of Appeals 50 as well as in the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”). 51 This, however, is only a beginning–more is to come. Of
course, professional groups like the ABA in conjunction with other national bar associations will
not relent, hoping to give lawyers as much freedom from FATF- type restrictions on their work.

50

Her Majesty’s Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and Others (2010) UKSC 2 & (2010) UKSC 5.
n Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05/P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi
& Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European
Communities (September 3, 2008) found it had jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of a measure giving effect to a
UN Security Council Resolution. The ECJ held that the European Union’s regulation implementing the Security
Council’s 1267 Sanctions Committee authority to freeze the funds and other assets of listed persons infringed the
rights to be heard and to effective judicial review since they involved no procedure for communicating evidence
justifying the listing of the Appellants. The ECJ also held that the freezing of the Appellants assets was an
unjustified restriction on their property. But see Swiss Federal Supreme Court case in Nada v State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs, Budesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court], November 14, 2007, 133 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] II 450-67 (Switzerland) (coming to the conclusion that Swiss Federal
Council’s decision pursuant to a decree to add Mr. Nada to be listed pursuant to the Security Council’s 1267
Committee mandate which resulted in the freezing of his assets and banned him from traveling was required by
Security Council decisions and that the guarantees Mr. Nada claimed were violated did not conflict with jus cogens
norms which would have given the Court jurisdiction to annul the Swiss decree).
51
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AML will continue to face challenges, as those interested in ML will seek new ways of
disguising their ill-gotten gains–such as through Trade Based Money Laundering, physical
movement of cash across national boundaries as well as purchases of real estate (e.g., the
purchases of real estate with piracy ransom in Kenya that has led to a huge rise in real estate
values there) and so on. The work of the FATF will therefore be a continuous process of catching
up with crime.

On another note, the FATF’s recommendations, such as those on mutual legal assistance and the
adoption of common standards, whether rule- or risk-based are quickly eroding the traditional
problems of conflicts of law and jurisdictions. That is a very interesting development given that
conflicts in other areas reflect lack of uniform standards and often the projection of the norms of
western states on non-western states. In short, IOs like the FATF are increasingly becoming the
platform for projecting western norms less visibly than if this were done through IMF or World
Bank conditionality.
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